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Abstract
Correlation is a basic concept in both game theory and quantum mechanics. We show that
there is a formal correspondence between the treatment of correlation in the two domains. We
use this correspondence to comment on the notion of a quantum game.
1 Introduction
The idea of correlation in game theory (GT) goes back to von Neumann [26, 1928] and von Neumann-
Morgenstern [28, 1944]. They deﬁned a cooperative game by starting with a non-cooperative game
and allowing correlated behavior among the players. (Formally, the characteristic function for a
subset A of players is the maximin payoﬀ to A in the associated zero-sum game between A and not-
A.) Aumann [1, 1974] introduced the idea of explaining correlation via the addition of “signals”
(formally, payoﬀ-irrelevant moves by Nature) to the underlying game.
Correlation plays a fundamental role in quantum mechanics (QM). This was observed in a fa-
mous paper by Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen [10, 1935]. Here is the idea.1 Two particles are prepared
in a special way (called a “singlet” state) and then separated, and their spins in various directions
are measured with detectors. The spin in any direction takes the value +1 or −1 (the spin is quan-
tized). Also, the spin is equally likely to be found to be +1 or −1. But, if the same angle is chosen
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1To be precise, in the reformulation due to Bohm [5, 1951].for both detectors, then the two spins will be perfectly correlated (actually, anti-correlated in the
usual physical set-up). This is the phenomenon of quantum-mechanical entanglement, or, in Ein-
stein’s famous phrase, “spooky action at a distance.” Knowledge of the outcome of a measurement
performed on one particle appears to ‘ﬁx’ the result of a measurement on another particle (which
could be a long distance away).
In this note, we establish a formal correspondence between the treatment of correlation in these
two domains. The correspondence is exact—the same mathematical conditions are used. Is the
connection a coincidence? No. It reﬂects the fact that at some level there can only be one
‘architecture’ of correlation, regardless of the interpretation put on the mathematics. Of course,
the interpretations are very diﬀerent in the two domains, as we will note.
We use this connection to comment on the idea of a quantum game. These games were introduced
by Eisert-Wilkens-Lewenstein [11, 1999] and Meyer [22, 1999]. (Recent papers on the topic include
Landsburg [20, 2005], La Mura [19, 2005], and Kargin [16, 2007]. These papers contain additional
references.) In a quantum game, players make use of entanglement to achieve outcomes that might
not be possible in a classical setting. But there has been some question as to whether quantum
game theory really generalizes classical game theory—see Levine [21, 2005]. We will comment on
this issue.
2 Correlation in GT
Fix an underlying game and an observer’s probability assessment of the players’ strategy choices in
the game. Figure 1 is a typical example (see Aumann [1, 1974], [2, 1987]). The observer has a
correlated assessment that assigns probability 1
2 to the event that Ann and Bob choose U and L,
and probability 1
2 to the event that they choose D and R.
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The question is whether such a correlated assessment should be allowed under non-cooperative
theory, which assumes that the players choose strategies independently. Aumann argued that the
answer is yes. His idea is to modify the initial game by adding “signals” (formally, payoﬀ-irrelevant
moves by Nature). For example, Figure 2 is obtained from Figure 1 by adding a signal, which is l
or r with equal probability. The players observe the signal and then choose independently. The
observer thinks that: (i) if Nature chooses l, then Ann chooses U and Bob chooses L; and (ii) if
Nature chooses r, then Ann chooses D and Bob chooses R. The two matrices give the observer’s
2(degenerate) conditional probabilities.2
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Here is a formalization of this idea, based on Brandenburger-Friedenberg [6, 2004]. Fix an
underlying game (strictly, game form) and let Sa (resp. Sb) be Ann’s (resp.Bob’s) strategy set. In
the extended game, Nature goes ﬁrst and makes a payoﬀ-irrelevant move that consists of choosing
a point (λ
a,λ
b) from some ﬁnite product space Λa × Λb. Ann (resp.Bob) observes the component
λ
a (resp. λ
b).3 These are the players’ signals. The players then make choices as in the underlying
game. Let p be the observer’s probability measure (assessment) on Sa×Sb×Λa×Λb. We stipulate
two conditions (adapted from [6, 2004]4):
Conditional Independence The observer assesses Ann’s and Bob’s strategy choices as










Suﬃciency If the observer knows Ann’s signal, and comes to learn Bob’s signal, this
won’t change the observer’s assessment of Ann’s strategy choice. Likewise with Ann and











2Note the identiﬁcation of moves in the two subtrees in Figure 2. This is the basis for saying that the assessments
in Figures 1 and 2 agree.
3Finiteness of Λa and Λb is, of course, a restriction, but it does allow us to avoid any measure-theoretic issues.
On the other hand, the product structure is without loss of generality. If, instead, Ann (resp. Bob) has a partition
Ha (resp. Hb) of a space Λ, just take Λa (resp. Λb) to be the quotient space {ha : ha ∈ Ha} (resp. {hb : hb ∈ Hb})
and move the probabilities over in the obvious way.
4The focus of [6, 2004] is on developing a concept of “intrinsic” correlation in games. This is correlation that
comes not from outside signals but from the players’ own beliefs about the game. The conditions formulated in [6,
2004] are easily adapted to the current “extrinsic” setting (with signals), as we now do.
3Here is an easy consequence of these conditions. (See Brandenburger-Friedenberg [6, 2004,
Proposition 9.1] for a much more general result.)





























{λb : p(λb)>0} p(sb|λ
b)p(λ
b)
= p(sa) × p(sb),
as required.
In words, under Conditional Independence and Suﬃciency, if the observer assesses Ann’s and
Bob’s signals as independent, then he assesses their strategy choices as independent. Taking the
contrapositive, we see that Conditional Independence and Suﬃciency guarantee that correlation in
play implies (‘comes from’) correlation in signals. This is the non-cooperative view we wanted to
formalize.
Note that this treatment of correlation is somewhat diﬀerent from the usual one. Aumann [1,
1974] proposed the concept of correlated equilibrium as the embodiment of non-cooperative play in
the presence of signals. We don’t want to impose this or any other solution concept. We want to
capture just the idea that the players are acting non-cooperatively. We make no assumptions (e.g.,
maximizing behavior) beyond this. The players simply do whatever they do—rather like particles,
in fact. Indeed, our formalization will yield the connection to QM (to come in Section 4).
3 A Positive and a Negative Result
We explained the correlation in Figure 1 by transforming it into Figure 2. Can this always be done?
The ﬁrst answer is yes. Fix an observer’s assessment q on Sa×Sb. We want spaces Λa and Λb and
a measure p on Sa × Sb × Λa × Λb, such that p agrees with q on Sa × Sb and satisﬁes Conditional






q(sa,sb) if sa = λ
a and sb = λ
b,
0 otherwise.
4It is easy to check that Conditional Independence and Suﬃciency both hold. (The basic idea of the
















Next, though, is a more complicated game where, under certain conditions, the answer is no.
Figure 3 is essentially Figure 1 in Forges [13, 1986] (but without payoﬀs). Notice that the game
already contains a move by Nature (which could be payoﬀ-relevant). This is not to be confused
with any (payoﬀ-irrelevant) moves by Nature we decide to add to the game.
Let the observer have an assessment q satisfying q(U|left) = 1 and q(D|right) = 1. As before,
we ask: Can we ﬁnd spaces Λa and Λb and a build a measure p on the extended game that agrees
with q and that captures non-cooperative play?
To address this, we ﬁrst have to extend our deﬁnitions to situations where the underlying game
already contains moves by Nature. We won’t consider a general tree, but will suppose that there is
a basic game (form) Sa ×Sb. We then build a larger game in which Nature goes ﬁrst and chooses a
point (µa,µb) from some ﬁnite product space Ma × Mb. Ann (resp.Bob) observes the component
µa (resp. µb). Ann (resp.Bob) then makes a choice sa ∈ Sa (resp. sa ∈ Sa). Thus, in Figure
3, Ma = {∅}, Mb = {left, right}, and we identify Bob’s moves in the two subtrees.) Note: We
use µ rather than λ to distinguish (payoﬀ-relevant) moves by Nature in the underlying game from
(payoﬀ-irrelevant) moves by Nature in an extended game.
Here are the extensions of Conditional Independence and Suﬃciency from earlier (we won’t give
them new names):






















5The rationale for these conditions is as before, with the diﬀerence that now we take account of
the fact that Ann observes both µa (from the underlying game) and λ
a (from the extended game),
and likewise for Bob.5
Under conditions (1) and (2), there is no diﬃculty in deriving the assessment q(U|left) = 1 and
q(D|right) = 1 by adding signals to Figure 3. The construction (which works for any game of the
type described above) is essentially the same as before: Set Λa = Sa × Ma and Λb = Sb × Mb and
build p via a diagonal construction.
But, suppose the move left or right by Nature in Figure 3 corresponds to a private coin toss by
Bob and is therefore independent of any signals that we add to the game. (This is the scenario that
Forges [13, 1986, pp.1378-9] considers.) In this case, we should impose an additional condition:
λ-Independence The observer assesses moves by Nature in the underlying game and
moves by Nature in the extended game as independent. Formally,
p(µa,µb,λ
a,λ
b) = p(µa,µb) × p(λ
a,λ
b). (3)
Now, we can’t derive the assessment q(U|left) = 1 and q(D|right) = 1 via signals. This is
intuitively clear. Ann’s choice can depend on her signal, which may be correlated with Bob’s signal.
But it cannot depend on Bob’s coin toss if this is independent of the signals. An assessment with
q(U|left) ￿= q(U|right) fails this requirement. Here is the formal statement:
Proposition 2 Consider the game in Figure 3. There is a probability measure q on Sa × Sb ×
Ma ×Mb for which there are no (ﬁnite) spaces Λa and Λb, and probability measure p on Sa ×Sb ×
Ma ×Mb ×Λa ×Λb, such that p agrees with q on Sa ×Sb ×Ma ×Mb and satisﬁes Suﬃciency and
λ-Independence.
Proof. Suppose q(left) > 0, q(right) > 0, and q(U|left) ￿= q(U|right). Under the contrary





















where the ﬁrst line uses agreement, the third line uses Suﬃciency, and the fourth line uses λ-
Independence. But we can repeat the argument for q(U|right), to get q(U|left) = q(U|right), a
contradiction.
5In a general tree, with more conditioning events than just Nature’s initial move, we would need to extend (1)
and (2) appropriately.
6Forges [13, 1986] uses this example to conclude that communication in games can sometimes
yield outcomes not possible under correlation. The idea is to let Bob inform Ann of Nature’s choice
(left or right). Now, an observer’s assessment with q(U|left) = 1 and q(D|right) = 1 becomes
reasonable. Formally, following each of Nature’s moves (left or right) in Figure 3, we would add
payoﬀ-irrelevant moves for Bob (say “left” or “right”) which are observed by Ann. We come back
to the issue of communication in Section 5.
Note that Proposition 2 uses only Suﬃciency and λ-Independence. What about Conditional
Independence, which we said is also conceptually appropriate for non-cooperative analysis? In fact,
there is always an extended game in which Conditional Independence and λ-Independence hold.
(This follows from Brandenburger-Yanofsky [7, 2007, Theorem 3.2].) We touch on Conditional
Independence again below.
4 QM and Hidden Variables
Now the connection to QM. Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen [10, 1935, p.777] drew the lesson from their
thought-experiment that QM needed to be made “complete.” That is, additional variables, usually
called hidden variables, needed to be added to the theory to explain the correlations. This is like
the move in GT from Figure 1 to Figure 2, where an extra variable (a move by Nature) is added. In
the QM setting, a hidden variable would be introduced that determines—when the two particles are
prepared—whether the outcomes of the measurements on them will be +1 and −1, or −1 and +1.
More generally, the goal of the hidden-variable program in QM is to build extended models that
satisfy certain desiderata and that reproduce the predictions of QM. What are these desiderata?
They are precisely conditions (1)-(3) above.
To see this, reinterpret the variables. We now think of µa and µb as the measurements Ann
and Bob make, sa and sb as the outcomes of the measurements, and (as before) λ
a and λ
b as extra
(hidden) variables. (The scenario might involve two diﬀerent particles, or two measurements on
one particle.)
Condition (1) (reinterpreted this way) is called Outcome Independence in QM (Jarrett [15,













b) > 0 and p(sa,µa,µb,λ
a,λ
b) > 0. This says that conditional on the
values of the hidden variables and the measurements undertaken, the outcome of a measurement
is (probabilistically) unaﬀected by the outcome of another measurement. Condition (2) is called
Parameter Independence ([15, 1984], [24, 1986]). It says that, conditional on the values of the
hidden variables, the outcome of a measurement depends (probabilistically) only on that measure-
7ment and not on another measurement. Condition (3) says that the process determining the hidden
variables is independent of what measurements are conducted. The term λ-Independence for this
condition is found in Dickson [9, 2005, p.140].









b) > 0. It is easily seen to be equivalent to the conjunction of (1) and (2)
(Jarrett [15, 1984]). The Non-Contextuality condition (Kochen-Specker [17, 1967]) is that
q(sa|µa,µb) = q(sa|µa, ˜ µb),
q(sb|µa,µb) = q(sb|˜ µa,µb),
whenever q(µa,µb) > 0, q(µa, ˜ µb) > 0, and q(˜ µa,µb) > 0. In words, this says the probability
(without introducing hidden variables) of obtaining a particular outcome of a measurement does not
depend on what other measurement is performed. It is not hard to see that Non-Contextuality is
implied by the conjunction of (2) and (3). (We showed this for a particular case in the course of
proving Proposition 2. But the argument is clearly general. See also Brandenburger-Yanofsky [7,
2007, Proposition 2.2].)
Can the hidden-variable program actually be carried out? Two famous impossibility results
showed that there are limits to what is possible. Bell [3, 1964] produced a physical model obeying
the rules of QM that could not be derived from a hidden-variable model satisfying Locality and
λ-Independence—i.e., satisfying (1), (2), and (3). The stronger Kochen-Specker [17, 1967] result is
that there is a physical model in QM that fails Non-Contextuality. (A fortiori, the model cannot
be derived from a hidden-variable model satisfying (2) and (3).)
We see the continuing parallel. The game of Figure 3 plays the same role in GT as Kochen-
Specker does in QM. (The Kochen-Specker set-up is more complicated than a direct translation
of Figure 3 would indicate. The reason is the constraints needed to get Non-Contextuality in an
actual physical model.6)
6More detail for the interested reader: In Kochen-Specker, the spin of one particle is measured in various directions.
The spin in any direction can take values +1, 0, or −1. The arrangement is such that if the spin is measured in each
of three orthogonal directions, and the squares of the three spins are calculated, we will always get two 1’s and one 0.
But, it is impossible to assign to each point on a sphere a 1 or a 0 so that: (i) every set of three orthogonal points
has two 1’s and one 0; and (ii) antipodal points are both 0’s or both 1’s. The conclusion is that the outcome of a
measurement of (the square of) spin in one direction must depend on which other directions of measurement are also
chosen. Non-Contextuality fails.
Kochen-Specker actually give an argument involving only ﬁnitely many diﬀerent directions of measurement. The
number of directions needed has been reduced over time. An important reference on this is Peres [23, 1991].
85 Quantum Games
Now put GT and QM together. This is what the quantum games literature does. (References
were given earlier.7) We can get the essential idea from the game of Figure 3. Ann and Bob
decide to peg their choices on a quantum device, as follows. If Bob sees Nature move left, he
makes a certain measurement on a particle. If he sees Nature move right, he makes another
measurement. Without seeing any of this, Ann makes her own measurement on the particle.
Depending on the outcome of her measurement, Ann moves U or D. But the set-up is of the
Kochen-Specker kind, so that the outcome of Ann’s measurement depends on what measurement
Bob makes.8 (Non-Contextuality fails.) In this case, an observer might well hold an assessment
with q(U|left) ￿= q(U|right). Proposition 2 says that such an assessment is impossible under classical
correlation alone.
Levine [21, 2005] is a critique of quantum games, taking the position that they can be fully
encompassed within classical games. We can see his argument with the help, once again, of Figure
3. Levine would point out that q(U|left) ￿= q(U|right) can be obtained classically, if the players are
allowed to communicate—i.e., if “cheap talk” à la Crawford-Sobel [8, 1982] and Farrell [12, 1987] is
allowed. (We said that for Forges [13, 1986], the point of Figure 3 was to show that communication—
of the classical kind—is diﬀerent from correlation.) Quantum game theorists, presumably, take
the view that the kind of “communication without communication” allowed by Kochen-Specker is
nevertheless of interest. Levine [21, 2005, p.6] does add: “... quantum pseudo-communication may
have advantages of security; or may be available when other ‘true’ communication devices are not.”
Our small contribution (if any) to this issue is to try to state it in the very simplest terms, which
is what we believe Figure 3 does.
6 A Historical Note
There is, of course, another connection between GT and QM, via the towering ﬁgure of von Neumann.
In QM, von Neumann initiated the hidden-variable program and gave an impossibility argument.
In fact, his argument is now known to use too-strong assumptions (Bell [4, 1966]). It is the modern
impossibility results of Bell [3, 1964] and Kochen-Specker [17, 1967] that are now considered decisive.
Still, von Neumann’s position was clear, as in the often-quoted: “[T]he present system of quantum
mechanics would have to be objectively false, in order that another description of the elementary
processes than the statistical one [i.e., in order that a hidden-variable description] be possible” ([27,
1955, p.325]).
In GT, we noted that von Neumann initiated the study of correlation ([26, 1928], [28, 1944]).
However, there does not appear to be any evidence that he saw any formal connection between these
7Lambert-Mogiliansky, Zamir, and Zwirn [18, 2003] and Temzelides [25, 2005] put QM and GT together in a
diﬀerent way. They employ aspects of QM—such as non-commutativity—in building non-classical decision theories.
8Experimental demonstrations of Kochen-Specker now exist; see Hasegawa et al. [14, 2006].
9two enterprises.9
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